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African International Legal Histories –




Hitherto, the ‘African part’ of the history of international law has often been limited to
the (critical engagement with) ‘the acquisition of Africa’ since the 1880s and questions of ‘state
succession’ and international borders following independence starting in the 1950s. In this
historical narrative, the dominance of colonialism is evident. It seems that ‘Africa’ as a narra-
tive concept in international legal history remains tied to abstract contrasts such as ‘foreign
domination’ versus ‘independence’, or ‘exploitation’ versus ‘development’. However, if twenty-
ﬁrst century writings about ‘international law in Africa’ and its histories remain shaped
by this perspective, historians may lose sight of issues, questions, or ideas formed in historical
Africa that do not ﬁt into this preconceived dichotomous matrix. After discussing methodo-
logical challenges, this article asks for other ‘contacts’, other arenas of ‘internationality’
and international law in Africa’s pre-colonial past. These contacts reach back very far in his-
tory. Three arenas are mentioned: the Red Sea area and Ethiopian-Arab relations; the Indian
Ocean rim; and ﬁnally, the case of nineteenth-century Ethiopia.
Keywords
Africa; Ethiopia; history; international law; presentism
1. INTRODUCTION
The ﬁeld of academic historiography of Africa as it has evolved over the last 50-odd
years has its own history by now. The sub-ﬁeld of African legal history, however, has
barely reached the sophistication of topics as have, for instance, African social or eco-
nomic history. This article undertakes to lay out perspectives and possibilities of
African international legal histories as they can be analyzed based on current research.
Looking at the existing literature, the ﬁrst part of this article considers the meth-
odological challenges encountered by scholars interested in African international
legal histories. Among those are the risks of projecting ‘presentist’ European inter-
national law categories onto African states when analyzing the continent’s past.
Also, the dominance of the subject of colonialism in the historiographic analysis
is most evident. However, with such an exclusive focus on ‘international law in
Africa’ as a heritage of colonialism, this article argues, historians lose sight of issues,
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questions, or ideas formed in historical Africa that do not ﬁt into the dichotomous
matrix of the adversarial European-African encounter of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. By looking beyond colonialism, which was, after all, ‘merely an episode
in African history’, other and new regions and periods in African history can be traced
that hitherto barely played a role in international legal historiography. By way of
example, the second part of this article discusses the existence of several arenas of
‘internationality’ in Africa’s past. Here, three such contacts between African and
non-African peoples can be used as guides towards potential avenues for further
research: ﬁrst, the Red Sea area and the Ethiopian-Arab relations starting in the
pre-Christian period; second, the Swahili Coast; third, the case of nineteenth-century
Ethiopia and the question of its admittance to the ‘family of nations’ opens
a perspective that connects African history with the development of European
international law. Thereby, it is argued, aspects of inter-state law in Africa come
to light which existed prior to European colonialism and which, thus, illuminate
alternative institutions in the history of international law.
2. AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORIES AS A SUBJECT:
METHODS, SOURCES, LIMITATIONS
2.1. On the conditions of possibility of African international
legal histories
No one doubts that there is (or has been) a jus gentium europaeumwhose past is wor-
thy of analysis and debate. The development of a ‘Latin American international law’
has been equally discussed.1 Even though neither librarians nor ‘Google’ can ﬁnd
a single entry for a jus gentium africanum, is it fair to pose the question whether there
is a speciﬁc, recognizable ‘African international public law’?2 Recent scholarship
has argued, for example, that ‘by accepting to respect the pre-existing [colonial]
frontiers [on their achievement of independence] without being obliged by any
law principle to do so African states created new customary rules’. The former
Sudanese negotiator with South Sudan, advocate Dirdeiry Ahmed, describes this
as the creation of ‘a special customary territorial regime that changes in many
respects the way international law applies to Africa’.3 Is this a recent development?
And is it possible at all to answer this question? For evident reasons – namely, the
sources or the lack thereof – the legal past is more difﬁcult to analyze. Furthermore,
why should the existence of a speciﬁcally ‘African’ international law be assumed?
Among Africans, or more precisely, African rulers, politicians, or others engaged
in foreign affairs, there was in the past centuries no consciousness of ‘Africa’.
This is at least what historians of Africa can ascertain from the sources. Treatises
1 A. Becker Lorca, ‘Eurocentrism in the History of International Law’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.),
Oxford Handbook of International Law (2012), 1034; A. Becker Lorca, ‘International Law in Latin America
or Latin American International Law? Rise, Fall, and Retrieval of a Tradition of Legal Thinking and
Political Imagination’, (2006) 47 Harvard Journal of International Law 283.
2 C. Young, ‘Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the African State System’, in F.M. Deng and
I. William Zartman (eds.), Conﬂict Resolution in Africa (1991), 320, at 343 (using this expression and referring
to the Organisation of African Unity).
3 D.M. Ahmed, Boundaries and Secession in Africa and International Law. Challenging Uti Possidetis (2015), 3.
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of African history usually begin or end by laying out how ‘Africa’ had been
‘invented’ or ‘imagined’, most of all by European scholars. Over centuries, they
not only imagined the togetherness or shared identity of the continent and the
peoples living in it but they also turned it argumentatively into what Valentin
Mudimbe called a ‘paradigm of difference’ and claimed its a-historicity.4 Aca-
demic historical research about Africa, in turn, is thus a rather recent phenomenon
and it still has to surmount challengeswhen it comes to the description and analysis
of ‘development’ and structural changes, in particular with regard to the historicity
of pre-colonial Africa.5 International lawyers interested in Africa’s past aimed at
reserving for Africa its rightful place in the development of international law.6
However, scholars like the Nigerian law professor and judge, Taslim Olawale
Elias, were, as will be shown hereunder, rather interested in the contemporary
period and dealt with pre-colonial Africa only on the margins. On the other hand,
Elias was eager to overcome an overly simplistic juxtaposition of ‘African’ versus
‘European’ law, even though he did extensive research on the nature of African cus-
tomary law. Yet, as Mark Toufayan underlines, Elias’ ‘overall project’was to empha-
size that ‘both [Africa and Europe] shared similar legal ideas’. This, in turn, was
‘testimony to “the unity of all human knowledge and experience”, and [both Africa
and Europe] were accordingly brought together under law’s yoke’.7
This commitment in favour of a ‘normalization’ of Africa’s past and against
any forms of exoticizing the continent opens new possibilities for the analysis
of African international legal histories. Hitherto, the ‘African part’ of the history
of international law was often limited to the (critical engagement with) ‘the
acquisition of Africa’ since the 1880s, and questions of ‘state succession’ and
international borders following independence starting in the 1950s.8 In this his-
torical narrative the dominance of colonialism is evident. It seems that ‘Africa’
as a narrative concept in international legal history remains tied to abstract con-
trasts such as ‘foreign domination’ versus ‘independence’ or ‘exploitation’ versus
‘development’. However, if twenty-ﬁrst century writings about ‘international law
in Africa’ and its histories remains shaped by this perspective, historians may lose
sight of issues, questions, or ideas formed in historical Africa that do not ﬁt into
this preconceived dichotomous matrix. This is not to argue that the historical
roots of current affairs and the indisputable challenges in contemporary Africa
in relation to colonialism shall not also guide our historical interests.
However, by trying to seek for and understand other African international
legal histories we gain a more complete insight into the continent’s past and its
4 For an overview, see A. Sonderegger, Kurze Geschichte des Alten Afrika (2017), 10; J. Parker and R. Rathbone,
African History. A Very Short Introduction (2007), 2, referring to V. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa (1988);
F. Dübgen and S. Skupien, ‘Das Politische in der Afrikanischen Philosophie’, in F. Dübgen and
S. Skupien (eds.), Afrikanische politische Philosophie (2015), 9, at 10.
5 A. Jones, Afrika bis 1850 (2016), 18.
6 T.O. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law (1972).
7 M. Toufayan, ‘When British Justice (in African Colonies) Points TwoWays. On Dualism, Hybridity, and the
Genealogy of Juridical Negritude in Taslim Olawale Elias’, in O. Onazi (ed.), African Legal Theory and
Contemporary Problems (2014), 31, at 45 (quoting T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (1956), 6).
8 G. Oduntan, International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa (2015).
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autonomous historical developments. Colonialism was, as the Nigerian historian,
Jacob Ade Ajayi, famously put it, an episode in African history.9 A few years later the
legal scholar, Charles H. Alexandrowicz, also conﬁrmed: ‘[T]he colonial period
in Africa, if considered against the background of African history as a whole, is
of negligible duration.’10 So it is obvious that, in time and space, African inter-
national legal histories deserve a larger spectrum. This is possible since there
are, as James Thuo Gathii argued in an article summarizing the state of the art,
indeed multiple examples that ‘offer evidence of the presence of “internationality”
or contact between Africa and Europe’.11 Yet, it is high time to widen this perspec-
tive beyond the South-North, African-European axis and to ask for other ‘contacts’,
other arenas of ‘internationality’ in Africa’s past.
Even though it is not entirely clear how Gathii deﬁnes his concept of ‘interna-
tionality’, the term is at least to be understood as a precondition of any manifes-
tation of ‘international law’. Asked differently, can it be useful in the African
historical context, as some have suggested as a potential avenue for ‘overcoming
Eurocentrism’, to seek for a ‘radical shift of vocabulary’ and try, for example,
to consider the meaning of ‘international law’ in a somewhat broader context?
This is being understood as ameans to ‘enable us to see things that were previously
hidden’.12 After all, it is part of the prevalence of Western narratives (politically
and historiographically) to deﬁne ‘subjects’ of international law and ‘members
of the international community’. These powers to deﬁne must, however, not be
allowed to develop into a hindrance to historical research by categorically declar-
ing that this or that act, discourse, or custom in the past is or is not international
law, but (only?) international relations. The term ‘internationality’ then can
abstain from distinguishing between states and ‘quasi-states’.13 Looking at the
existing literature, for historians and other researchers of Africa, it has barely been
a question whether or not to call an African polity a ‘state’ (in the English lan-
guage). Ali Mazrui, for example, mentions that ‘the pre-colonial African states have
indulged in : : : land worship’.14 Others analyze the ‘political economy of a preco-
lonial African state’, Bagirmi, near Lake Chad.15 The term ‘empire’, too, has been
used in an intra-African, pre-colonial setting, Songhay being one example.16
Similarly, the meaning of ‘rules’ and ‘customs’ applied in a speciﬁc historical con-
text between such states must not adhere to the latest deﬁnitions in international
9 J.F. Ade Ajayi, ‘Colonialism. An Episode in African History’, in L.G. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in
Africa 1870–1960 (1969), vol. I.
10 C.H. Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation. A Study in Treaty Making (1973), 127; cf. also
V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa (1988), 1.
11 J. T. Gathii, ‘Africa’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Law (2012), 407,
at 411.
12 A.-C. Martineau, ‘Overcoming Eurocentrism? Global History and the Oxford Handbook of the History of
International Law’, (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 329, at 330.
13 R. H. Jackson, Quasi-States. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (1990).
14 A. Mazrui, The Africans. A Triple Heritage (1986), 272.
15 S.P. Reyna, Wars without End. The political economy of a precolonial African state (1990).
16 J.O. Hunwick, Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire. Al-Sa’di’s Ta’rikh Al-sudan down to 1613 and other contemporary
documents (2003); see J. Vansina, ‘A Comparison of African Kingdoms’, (1962) 32 Africa: Journal of the
International African Institute 324 (classifying Sub-Saharan kingdoms); see W. Hawthorne, ‘States and
Statelessness’ in J. Parker and R. Reid (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Modern African History (2013), 77 at 79f.
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law text books (to the issues of ‘presentism’ and ‘anachronism’, we turn later).
Perhaps it sufﬁces here to recall that in the ﬁeld of comparative law legal scholars
also use the concept and terminology of ‘functional equivalent’,17 and so historians
have done successfully when analyzing the past.18
By giving European colonialism its fair share – notmore but also not less – in these
African histories, we can go beyond the dichotomies and ask for arenas of inter-
national law on the African continent that lay outside the orbit of European domi-
nation. Thereby, we can explore blind spots in the historiography of ‘internationality’
understood to include international law that nevertheless had decisive impact on the
historic development of wide regions within and beyond the continent. Arnulf
Becker Lorca recently argued that, before the second half of the nineteenth century,
international law had not yet acquired ‘a global geographical scope’; rather, this pre-
history consisted of ‘different – geographically and culturally disconnected – regional
orders’.19 Be that as it may, these regional orders of ‘internationality’ in Africa also
need to be taken into consideration – not the least because this enables scholars
to discuss more critically the ‘origins’ of international law and the contributions
of particular regions on its development.
2.2. ‘Presentism’ and ‘relevance’: What (legal) histories of Africa are we
writing, and why?
Many are the warnings against ‘presentism’. Lynn Hunt, then-president of the
American Historical Association, warned in 2002: ‘Presentism, at its worst, encour-
ages a kind of moral complacency and self-congratulation. Interpreting the past in
terms of present concerns usually leads us toﬁnd ourselvesmorally superior.’20 This
warning holds particular bearing for legal historians who may be tempted to inter-
pret the laws of the past in light of present-day laws and morals.
An additional element of ‘presentism’ besets international legal history in yet
a different way than the ‘presentist’ interpretation of the past. Apart from questions
of colonialism from 1880 to 1960 and slavery, the sub-ﬁeld of African international
legal history plays amarginal role in the study of law and legal history in Africa. For
example, theAfrican Yearbook of International Law (founded in 1993) rarely publishes
articles with a focus on history.21 In turn, in the Journal of African History (founded
in 1960), probably setting the ‘gold standard’ in the Africanist discipline, legal sub-
jects are equally rare except for questions related to African statehood, which are
frequently discussed.22 This apparent lack of research in African international legal
17 K. Scheiwe, ‘Was ist ein funktionales Äquivalent in der Rechtsvergleichung? Eine Diskussion an Hand von
Beispielen aus dem Familien- und Sozialrecht’, (2000) 83 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft, 30.
18 See M. Pernau, Bürger mit Turban. Muslime in Delhi im 19. Jahrhundert (2008), 2–12.
19 A. Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842–1933 (2015), 10.
20 L. Hunt, ‘Against Presentism’, AHA Perspectives on History, 1 May 2002, available at www.historians.org/
publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/may-2002/against-presentism.
21 D.C.J. Dakas, ‘The Role of International Law in the Colonization of Africa. A Review in Light of Recent Calls
for Re-colonization’, (1999) 7 African Yearbook of International Law / Annuaire Africain de droit international 83.
22 The Journal of Modern African Studies, less inﬂuential though, published one article by the barrister-at-lawNii
Lante Wallace-Bruce. See N.L. Wallace-Bruce, ‘Africa and International Law. The Emergence to Statehood’,
(1985) 23 Journal of Modern African Studies 575; see also G.N. Uzoigwe, ‘Spheres of Inﬂuence and the Doctrine
of the Hinterland in the Partition of Africa’ (1976) 3, Journal of African Studies 183.
AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORIES – INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AFRICA 901
histories may have to do with what can be called a sort of double-blindness that
affects this subject. Citing their lack of speciﬁc disciplinary knowledge, general
historians leave questions of legal history overwhelmingly to legal scholars based
in the faculties of law. The latter, including those scholars working in the ﬁeld of
international law, on the other hand, have their eyes ﬁxed on questions posed by
the present. It is not uncommon for international law scholars to describe their own
work as forming part of efforts ‘through which the relevance of international law
to the solution of the most urgent problems of our time ought to be enhanced’.23
Under these conditions, questions of the past aremostly worth consideration only if
they hold ‘relevance’ for the present. For legal scholars, questions such as ‘[i]f we
have rarely : : : heard about the history of international law beyond theWest, have
we missed something?’24, or even ‘[w]hy does the history matter?’, are legitimate –
and open – questions; whereas professional historians would consider this as amere
rhetorical exercise since answers in the negative would question one’s own profes-
sional life.25
Apart from the above-quoted work of Dirdeiry Ahmed, who meticulously ana-
lyzes the history and present of the principle of uti possidetis in the context
of African independence and ‘the prohibition of secession in Africa’ since the
1960s,26 two recent contributions (notably also written by legal scholars) demon-
strate that this argumentative prominence of ‘present-day relevance’ for one’s
own research is true also for African international legal histories:
Touching upon the ‘Courts of Mixed Commission’ in Sierra Leone and Angola,
among others, since the 1820s, Jenny S.Martinez examines the ‘role of international
law in the ending of the transatlantic slave trade’.27 In her own words, these com-
missions were ‘the ﬁrst international human rights courts’ and she thus suggests
that ‘this episode forms an important part of the history of international human
rights law’.28 Leaving aside the question of whether Martinez’s terminology is
merely a blunt projection of present categories onto that past, we ﬁrst and foremost
have to ask:Would it be worth it to write the history of these international courts in
Africa (an ‘episode’[!], i.e., on the periphery?) if they were not ‘important’ in the his-
tory of international human rights law and ‘international humanitarian interven-
tion’ (as some of her critics have argued)? These key words reverberate in the minds
of any informed reader of the news; in recent years they repeatedly stood at the
centre of international debates. The insistence of ‘present-day relevance’ of one’s
own (historical) research object, however, runs the risk of perpetuating the separa-
tion of periphery and centre. Why is it so important to show the relevance of one’s
own ‘peripheral’ research object (courts in Africa) to the history and present of the
23 K. Ginther, ‘Preface’, in K. Ginther and W. Benedek (eds.), New Perspectives and Conceptions of International
Law. An Afro-European Dialogue (1983), at v.
24 Becker Lorca, supra note 19, at 13.
25 P. Alston, ‘Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights. An analysis of competing histories of the
origins of international human rights law’, (2013) 126Harvard Law Review 2043; J. Martinez, ‘Human Rights
and History’, (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 221, at 236.
26 Ahmed, supra note 3, at 4.
27 J.S. Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law (2012).
28 Ibid., at 6; Martinez, supra note 25, at 221.
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‘centre’ (humanitarian intervention)? Is it that the ‘earlier’ plays a role because it
had an impact on a signiﬁcant (more signiﬁcant?) ‘later’, most of all the present?29
Mieke van der Linden addresses the question of a present responsibility under
international law of former colonial states for the past actions of the European
colonial powers.30 Aware of the trappings of the principle nulla poene sine lege,
van der Linden lays out with intellectual acuity in her introduction the challenge
that ‘jurists must always be aware of and avoid the fallacy of presentism: the anach-
ronistic application of present-day norms and values to the interpretation and
evaluation of past actions’.31 Thus, for her, the present state responsibility presup-
poses the violation of the international law that was applicable at the time of
Africa’s colonization by Europeans starting in the 1880s. This is evidently a histori-
cal undertaking (‘What was the international law that was applicable at the time of
Africa’s colonization? How, why, and by whom was this law violated?’). Still, these
questions about the past are merely raised in order to determine, based on this fac-
tual ‘context’, European states’ current legal responsibility and, subsequently, present
means of ‘redressing the illegality of Africa’s colonization’. Considering the amount
of Africanist historiography that van der Linden has used and her eagerness to
‘evaluate the past’ in light of the ‘standards as they stood at the time’, there are
indeed ‘no obstacles to a fruitful co-operation between historians and jurists in writ-
ing the history of international law’.32
Contemporary politics thus inﬂuences historical writing on ‘Africa and
International Law’, which, as the three authors mentioned above show, seeks to
be utilitarian for the present day.33 And this has a direct inﬂuence on the production
of knowledge about the past. Legal scholars like Anne Orford vehemently defend
this approach with a focus on the present and reject in no uncertain terms ‘contex-
tualist historians’ who have concentrated ‘on policing the idea that past texts must
not be approached anachronistically in light of current debates’.34 In her opinion
anachronism is not a methodological problem for legal scholars exactly because
the discipline of law ‘resist[s] such an easy temporal division’ between past and
present. Orford recognizes in the contextualist school’s ‘policing of anachronism
: : : a major theme in the response to critical histories of international law’. As a
result, she sees in the rejection of anachronism the refusal of ‘an overt engagement
with contemporary politics’.35
Whether or not the ‘political promise of critical international legal scholarship’36
provides a more encompassing view, not only of the present but also of the past,
29 On the problem of ‘present-day relevance’, see P. Borowsky, B. Vogel and H. Wunder, Einführung in die
Geschichtswissenschaft I, Opladen (1989), 14.
30 SeeM. van der Linden, The Acquisition of Africa (1870–1914). The Nature of Nineteenth-Century International Law
(2017).
31 Ibid., at 28.
32 Ibid., at 29, 245.
33 Cf. A.-C. Martineau, ‘A Forgotten Chapter in the History of International Commercial Arbitration. The Slave
Trade’s Dispute Settlement System’, (2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International Law 219, at 222 (‘While the focus
of the article is historical, the interest feeding it lies in the present.’).
34 A. Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’, (2013) 1 London Review of International Law 166, at 171.
35 Ibid. at 173–4.
36 M. Shahabuddin, Ethnicity and International Law. Histories, Politics and Practices (2016), 7.
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need not be discussed here. However, for the purposes of our symposium, which
is asking ‘why it is that we write the histories we write?’,37 it is, despite the claims
of an ‘apolitical’ or ‘uncritical’ impetus, nevertheless valid to point to presentism as
a force that determines ‘what we write’ and ‘what questions we fail to explore’. For,
those histories of international law (or for this purpose other ﬁelds such as eco-
nomic history38) in Africa that cannot boast reverberations and repercussions for
our own present-day, will, if anachronism is allowed to determine what is ‘relevant’,
barely be considered for ‘interpretation and evaluation’39 by historians or jurists.
As long as such African histories are not judged to be ‘relevant’ in the present-
day, like, for example, human rights, territorial claims, or piracy, the chances for
these other African international legal histories to bewritten remain dim. And these
chances get lower and lower the farther the research subject lies in the past. If it is
true that ‘post-colonialism has now become international law’s ofﬁcial ethos’,40 this
certainly has an inﬂuence on the writing about the histories of international law. If
we seek for historical traces and repercussions ofWestern colonialism, imperialism,
and inequalities in the international arena, then the research perspective neces-
sarily excludes all periods prior to the rise of these ideologies. Lynn Hunt, in her
above-quoted piece, noted the ‘shift of general historical interest toward the contem-
porary period’. She is concerned that the twentieth century would ‘crowd out every-
thing else’.41 In the historiography of international law this particular trend of
presentism is not as distinct as in other historical sub-disciplines given that a num-
ber of key interpreters of international law laboured in more distant centuries. Yet,
the period of approximately 1880 to 1970 is probably the most widely researched in
the ﬁeld.42 Interests triggered by the present dominate or even dictate the subjects
researched about the past.43 This is the pattern underlying the analysis of what legal
scholar Pio Caroni, not too long ago, called the ‘loneliness of the legal historian’.44
Those researchers who are interested in the origins of Mindermeinungen (minority
views) or legal provisions that no longer leave traces in present legislation or cus-
toms will ﬁnd it hard to boast about the ‘relevance’ of their research.
Yet, these presentist characteristics of research practices can change in the future.
Why should questions about the ‘relevance’ of historical considerations in research
related to international law always be at the forefront, threatening entire research
37 See G. Simpson, ‘Call for Papers’, Leiden Journal of International Law Symposium on ‘The Trajectories
of International Legal Histories’, 20 October 2017, available at www.cambridge.org/core/journals/
leiden-journal-of-international-law/information/call-for-papers.
38 Cf. M. Jerven, Africa. Why Economists get it wrong (2015), 45, on the presentist dealing of economists with
historical data about Africa.
39 van der Linden, supra note 30, at 28.
40 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International Law. Dealing with Eurocentrism’, (2011) 19 Rechtsgeschichte 152,
at 155.
41 Hunt, supra note 20.
42 This is at least the impression created by the titles of the two leading series in the ﬁeld: Studien zur Geschichte
des Völkerrechts (Nomos) and Studies in the History of International Law (Brill).
43 See O.C. Okafor, ‘After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate
Statehood in Africa’, (2000) 41Harvard International Law Journal 503, at 508, for another example of trying to
‘understand’ the ‘fragmentation of the post-colonial African state’ with an ‘exploration into the history of
state-building in Africa’.
44 P. Caroni, Die Einsamkeit des Rechtshistorikers. Notizen zu einem problematischen Lehrfach (2005).
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subjects with prejudicial verdicts of ‘irrelevance’ and ‘worthlessness’? In light of
recent publications in the ﬁeld, David Armitage and Jennifer Pitts notice a ‘new his-
tory of international law in our own globalizing, historicist moment’.45 Finally, it
is worth repeating a rather old and simple insight that sometimes gets out of
sight: ‘The controversy about relevance is indissoluble, since it cannot be resolved
wissenschaftsimmanent.’46
2.3. The weight of disciplinary divides: The languages of history or law
and their sources
Strangely enough, in the past decades historical scholarship about Africa did not
play a prominent role in the attempts of critical legal scholars of international
law in Africa to reevaluate their own research subject. In their works, methodologi-
cal concerns that would attest to the insight that, when writing (and reading) about
‘history’, we are rather dealing with representations of history are barely noticeable.
Adherents to a positivist reading of the sources that would allow for direct access
to ‘history’, neither T.O. Elias nor Charles. H. Alexandrowicz, seem to have bothered
about engaging with the state of the art of Africanist historiography. The latter was
burgeoning since the 1960s, having an eminently political task as its goal: to show
that pre-colonial Africa did have a history (the favourite opponent here was the
philosopher G.W.F. Hegel due to his damning verdict on Africa’s exclusion fromuni-
versal history – and thus reason47), whose sources were worthy of the same meth-
odological analysis and rigors as any other history.48 This intention to ‘de-exoticize’
Africa (and thus the newly independent states) as a research object by ‘correct[ing]
the historical record’ was, indeed, very similar to that at which scholars like Elias,
Okoye, or Alexandrowicz aimed.49
However, one would have liked to know, for example, what Alexandrowicz would
have made of Jan Vansina’s Kingdoms of the Savanna, about Central African political
units from the late ﬁfteenth century to 1900, in which the author speaks of the
African elite as ‘knights’, ‘dukes’, and ‘marquis’.50 To inform himself about general
historical events, Alexandrowicz seems to have relied completely on the small
45 D. Armitage and J. Pitts, ‘“This Modern Grotius”: An Introduction to the Life and Thought of C. H.
Alexandrowicz’, in D. Armitage and J. Pitts (eds.), C.H. Alexandrowicz: The Law of Nations in Global History
(2017), 1, at 1.
46 Borowsky, Vogel and Wunder, supra note 29, at 14.
47 See M.A.R. Habib,Hegel and Empire. From Postcolonialism to Globalism (2017), 49–64; B. Camara, ‘The Falsity of
Hegel’s Theses on Africa’, (2005) 36 Journal of Black Studies 82; R. Bernasconi, ‘Hegel at the Court of the
Ashanti’, in S. Barnett (ed.), Hegel After Derrida (1998), 45.
48 See three autobiographical accounts by the most outstanding ‘pioneers’: R. Oliver, In the Realms of Gold.
Pioneering in African History (1997); J. Vansina, Living With Africa (1994); J.D. Fage, ‘British African studies
since the Second World War. A personal account’, (1989) 88 African Affairs 397; cf. also D. Henige, The
Chronology of Oral Tradition. Quest for a Chimera (1974); B. Heintze and A. Jones, ‘European Sources for
Sub-Saharan Africa before 1900. Uses and Abuses’, (1987) 33 Paideuma; H. Behrend and T. Geider,
Afrikaner schreiben zurück. Texte und Bilder afrikanischer Ethnographen (1998); K. Arnaut and H. Vanhee,
‘History Facing the Present. An Interview with Jan Vansina’, (2001) 21 Forum: Nieuwsbrief van de
Belgische Vereniging van Afrikanisten – Bulletin de l’Association Belge des Africanistes 11; G. Castryck,
S. Strickrodt and K. Werthmann (eds.), Sources and methods for African history and culture. Essays in honour
of Adam Jones (2016).
49 Gathii, supra note 11, at 409; cf. C. Landauer, ‘Things Fall Together: The Past and Future Africas of T. O. Elias’s
Africa and the Development of International Law’, (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 351, at 361.
50 J. Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (1966).
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volume by Roland Oliver and John D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, a ‘classic’ ever
since its ﬁrst edition in 1962.51 To be fair, Elias quoted at least once the journalist
Basil Davidson, one of Britain’s most acclaimed Africanists of his generation and a
strong supporter of African independencemovements, making a comparison between
Frankish kingship and the rise of kingdoms in West Africa.52 Unmistakably, ‘Elias’
charge here is to establish the parallel of African and European kingdoms’.53
However, when Elias tried to highlight the historical ‘Contribution of Africa to
International Law’ in 1972,54 the Journal of African History was already in its twelfth
year and yet he did not refer to its articles once even though it would have furnished
him with ample material about African states.
What Africanists and legal scholarswith a focus onAfrica’s past have in common
is their regret about ‘the paucity of evidence about early African institutions’.55
Historians of international law, just as legal historians in general, cannot dowithout
written sources. This is, at least, the impression created when one looks at the list of
‘sources’ of any given legal history treatise. Material culture, so en vogue among his-
torians of culture and everyday life,56 has a hard time among legal historians.57 Even
photographs or maps are barely used.58 For historians of Africa’s international legal
past, this holds particular pitfalls. Apart from Amharic, Coptic (-Demotic), and
Arabic texts, there are barely any documents written by Africans that could give
insights into the continent’s past before the arrival of Arab and European visitors,
and later ‘explorers’ and empire-builders of the nineteenth century. The question is
thus: Is the writing of African international legal histories possible at all, if the
practices and customs applied in the handling of international affairs between
African peoples, however deﬁned, are not recorded? What can be said about pre-
colonial African legal vocabularies and inter-state dispute mechanisms in this case?
Given the fact that ‘[m]ost actors, contexts and events have been irredeemably lost’,
Martti Koskenniemi’s warnings against the ‘dangers of anachronism and concep-
tual imperialism’ seem justiﬁed.59 In this respect, the (European) terminology used
by historians and legal scholars alike is telling. To refer to the quotations above, is
it useful to draw a comparison between Frankish ‘kingship’ and the rise of king-
doms in West Africa? What do we understand better by establishing a ‘parallel
of African and European kingdoms’?60Where does comparison end and ‘conceptual
51 R. Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa (1962); see the review by G.N. Uzoigwe, ‘A Short History of
Africa by Roland Oliver, J. D. Fage’, (1978) 11 International Journal of African Historical Studies 137, on the
book’s ‘instant success’.
52 B. Davidson, The Africans: An Entry to Cultural History (1969), 185, as quoted in Elias, supra note 6, at 13.
53 Landauer, supra note 49, at 363.
54 Elias, supra note 6, at 3 (‘Chapter 1, The Contribution of Africa to International Law’).
55 Elias, supra note 6, at 13. On the challenges of the pre-colonial sources, cf. Jones, supra note 5, at 32–9.
56 R. Habermas and M. Füssel (eds.), (2015) 23(3) Historische Anthropologie, ‘Die Materialität der Geschichte’.
57 J. d’Aspremont, S. Besson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law (2017).
58 It is undoubtedly bad style to ﬂag one’s ownwork, but it is noteworthy that this author’sNaulila 1914.World
War I in Angola and International Law: A Study in (Post-)Colonial Border Regimes and Interstate Arbitration (2016),
is apparently the ﬁrst among 35 volumes in the Studien zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts series that contains
maps and photographs – other than portraits; also several articles in (2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International
Law, contain photographs which attests to a new openness to sources other than texts.
59 Koskenniemi, supra note 40, at 170.
60 Landauer, supra note 49, at 363.
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imperialism’ commence? On the other hand, it seems clear that it is not always
possible to replace this European terminology. Replace it with what? ‘One cannot
write by stepping outside the professional vocabulary inwhich these stories are told
and learned.’61 Others go so far as to argue that historians of international law seem
to have ‘accept[ed] that international law is a European vocabulary’.61
There are attempts by historians to ﬁnd new and different terminologies to over-
come the colonialist heritage in the vocabulary they use. This is true in particular
when it comes to ﬁnding the correct terminology for leaders of polities or states. In
order to replace the language of colonial sources (chief, kaptein, etc.), historians have
referred to terms used by the concerned African communities, such as ‘omuhona’, or
they resorted to general terms which avoided a direct comparative element with
European institutions, such as ‘big man’. Whether this is analytically successful
remains to be discussed, however. Legal historians have repeatedly pointed to a
conceptual ‘state of emergency’. It is the ‘crux’ for historiography, wrote the consti-
tutional historian Ernst Pitz, if it ‘cannot substantiate the legal concepts, which it
must use’.63 When writing about African societies the problem arises that certain
European categories of historical analysis are transferred and translated to African
systems of order. Thus, there are institutions that are presupposed for any analysis
of political systems, and therefore theWestern historian of Africa seeks for a ‘famil-
iar constellation of king, nobility, church, and merchants’.64 It seems a matter of
academic integrity to admit that to annul this conceptual ‘state of emergency’
was hitherto not yet possible.65
In addition, it is important in the context of African historiography to point out
sources other than texts. Linguistics and, most of all, archaeology are major ‘source
providers’ for historians of Africa. The prominence of archaeological ﬁndings in the
analysis of the continent’s past (especially prior to the nineteenth century) is unmis-
takable, even though the ﬁelds of history and archaeology are not without a sense of
disciplinary competition.66 Legal historians should, thus, not hesitate to widen their
research perspectives and methodologies in order to be able to learn from the
insights of these disciplines. The long-established ﬁeld of cuneiform law indicates
how specialist legal historians can enrich the entire ﬁeld with their insights.67
61 Koskenniemi, supra note 40, at 171.
62 Martineau, supra note 12, at 335.
63 E. Pitz, Verfassungslehre und Einführung in die deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte des Mittelalters (2006), 411. Es ist
eine „Crux“ für die Geschichtsschreibung, wenn sie „die Rechtsbegriffe, deren sie sich bedienen muß, nicht
begründen kann“.
64 S. Feierman, ‘Afrika in der Geschichte. Das Ende der universalen Erzählungen’, in S. Sebastian Conrad and
S. Randeria (eds.), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in denGe-schichts- undKulturwissenschaften
(2002), 50, at 63; see Pernau, supra note 18, at 8.
65 G. Krüger, ‘Der Löwe lagert unter der Schirmakazie. Der (mögliche) Beitrag der Afrikanischen Geschichte zu
einer Geschichtswissenschaft als Verﬂechtungsgeschichte’, (2014) 64 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte/
Revue Suisse d’Histoire, 224, at 233 (Krüger speaks of ‘Begriffs-U-Boote‘ and stipulates: ‘Dieses Problem ist nicht
zu lösen‘.)
66 J. Vansina, ‘Historians, are archeologists your siblings?’, (1995) 22 History in Africa 369; P. Robertshaw,
‘Sibling rivalry? The intersection of archaeology and history’, (2007) 27 History in Africa 261; see also the
journal African Archaeological Review.
67 R. Haase, Einführung in das Studium keilschriftlicher Rechtsquellen (1965); K. Radner and E. Robson (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Cuneiform Culture (2011).
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3. STILL TO BE WRITTEN: ARENAS OF ‘INTERNATIONALITY’ AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT
3.1. African regions in the historiography of international law
Decades ago Konrad Ginther, one of the European pioneers in his plea to include
‘African cases and materials’ in the teaching of and research about international
law, argued for ‘a new “wholeness” in the approach to international law’. In this
context he spoke of the need to take into account ‘new regions’. This quest for
‘new regions’ can be taken literally for research about African international legal
histories as well.68 ‘Wholeness’, then, must be taken in its spatial and temporal
meaning in order to come closer to the academic goal of ‘expanding histories of
International Law’.69
The African regions considered most important in the historiography of inter-
national law so far have been: the ‘Barbary Coast’ region along the middle and
western coastal regions of North Africa due to questions of piracy and slave trade;
the African west coast for its relevance to the Atlantic slave trade; the Congo basin
for its relation to the ‘scramble for Africa’ and the ‘Congo Act’ of 1885; and ﬁnally,
those regions along the coast and further inland whose rulers entered into treaties
with European powers, mostly in the decades from 1870 to 1890.70 Considering these
‘geographies of research’ of international lawyers,71 at least two of these research sub-
jects are directly related to European colonialism in Africa. However, the above-
mentioned diagnosis of Jacob Ajayi of colonialism as An Episode in African History72
must also be read as an invitation to look for other ‘episodes’.
It is a matter of course that international law treatises in their introductions refer
to the ‘roots of international law’ as to be found ‘in the ancient histories of the
Egyptians, Jews, Greeks, and Romans’.73 All of these four peoples have dwelled
on the African continent (admittedly only in its northern part). However, even
works that focus particularly on the role of Africa in international law mention
the pre-colonial part of these histories only in passing. For instance, Elias, probably
still the most-cited legal authority in the ﬁeld,74 devoted merely 11 pages of his 250-
page volume, Africa and the Development of International Law, to ‘Ancient Africa’ and
‘Indigenous African States to 1500 AD’. (Other histories of international law under-
stood as a jus gentium europaeum naturally do not concern themselves with these
subjects at all.) Elias was, like other ‘non-Western scholars : : : [eager to] assert
claims on behalf of and, fundamentally, within their own locality to a place in
68 K. Ginther, ‘The Teaching of International Law under a Developmental Aspect. The Relevance of African
Cases and Materials’, in K. Ginther and W. Benedek (eds.), New Perspectives and Conceptions of International
Law. An Afro-European Dialogue (1983), 216, at 224; Ginther, supra note 23, at v.
69 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Expanding Histories of International Law’, (2016) 56 American Journal of Legal History 104.
70 See ‘List of Treaties’, in Alexandrowicz, supra note 10, 129–41.
71 See N.M. Rajkovic, ‘The Visual Conquest of International Law. Brute Boundaries, the Map and the Legacy of
Cartogenesis’, (2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International Law 267, at 288.
72 Ade Ajayi, supra note 9.
73 J. Dugard, International Law. A South African Perspective (2001), 10.
74 See Landauer, supra note 49, and the other contributions in the same issue of the Leiden Journal of
International Law (Issue 2, Vol. 21 (2008)).
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law’s historical construction of its own narrative’.75 Yet, his historiographical efforts
went only so far. Using rather sketchy footnotes in his chapter on ‘Ancient Africa’,
he concerned himself mostly with Carthage and the Portuguese travelers, but he
also made allusion to ‘historical accounts of the inter-relationships between the
East African littoral and the Arabs, the [Indians and] Chinese and the Europeans,
as well for purposes of trade as for exploration and adventure’.76 The connection
between these topics and the ‘development of international law’ is not laid out
by Elias. He was more interested in situating his ‘narrative of Africa at the intersec-
tion of analyses of world history, legal consciousness, and legal pluralism’.77
However, these ‘inter-relationships’ attest undoubtedly to the above-quoted ‘inter-
nationality’ in African history.
3.2. Putting new regions and periods on the map
Given the limited regional scope of research on Africa in the historiography of
international law, it is about time to ask for other ‘contacts’, other arenas of ‘inter-
nationality’ in Africa’s past78 and use contacts between African and non-African
peoples as a guide towards potential avenues of such hitherto unexplored spaces.
These contacts reach back very far in history. Here, only a few arenas will be cur-
sorily mentioned: the Red Sea area and Ethiopian-Arab relations starting in the pre-
Christian period; the Indian Ocean rim and, most of all, the Yemeni lordship along
the Swahili Coast; and ﬁnally, the case of nineteenth century Ethiopia and the
question of its admittance to the ‘family of nations’, which opens a perspective that
connects African history with the development of European international law.
3.2.1. The Southern Red Sea connection
The ancient Egyptian and Near Eastern dimension of the history of international law
has been referred to repeatedly. Amnon Altman traces the Earliest Recorded Concepts
of International Law (2500-330 BCE) in this region.79 For example, the Pharaonic
international treaties of alliance with Middle-Eastern partners count among the old-
est international law documents. A prime example is the international correspon-
dence of Amenophis III and Akhenaten, dating from 1400 BC, detailing individual
provisions and their acceptance by Egypt’s alliance partner.80
The history of the regions further south at the Horn of Africa is far less explored
with regard to their relevance for the history of international law, even though over
the last millennia the political history of the southern edge of the Red Sea also
shows clear signs of ‘internationality’.81 Over recent decades, archaeologists and
75 Toufayan, supra note 7, at 32.
76 Elias, supra note 6, at 5.
77 Toufayan, supra note 7, at 36, 44 (referencing Ali Mazrui).
78 Gathii, supra note 11, at 411.
79 A. Altman, Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law. The Ancient Near East (2500-330 BCE)
(2012).
80 R. Westbrook, ‘International Law in the Amarna Age’, in R. Cohen and R. Westbrook (eds.), Amarna diplo-
macy. The beginnings of international relations (2000), 28–40; see also L. Török, Between two worlds. The frontier
region between Ancient Nubia and Egypt 3700 BC – 500 AD (2009).
81 G. Hatke, Africans in Arabia Felix. Aksumite Relations with Himyar in the Sixth Century CE, Ph.D. thesis,
Princeton University (2011).
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linguists have found and explored a ‘small corpus’ of Sabean scriptural testimonies
in the Ethiopian highlands originating in the ﬁrst millennium BC.82 They have
established a massive cultural transfer from South Arabia into the Ethiopian high-
lands. Archaeologists and linguists do not hesitate to speak of ‘states’ in the region.83
We know, however, very little about the political and diplomatic arrangements
found between the Sabeans and the (former) rulers of Tigray in Ethiopia. What
is evident from Sabean sources is that the rulers (Malik) were willing and capable
to undertake diplomatic initiatives in order to further their trade interests (secure
passage for incense caravans to the Mediterranean Sea) to the north with the
Assyrians. The texts found so far in the Sabean heartland, such as the Gesta of
Yiṯ aʿʾamar of Saba (found in 2005 in Sirwah, dating from around 715 BC), are of spe-
cial interest to legal historians insofar as they not only refer to campaigns (unfortu-
nately not on the African side of the Red Sea) or construction projects. Rather,
they contain ‘legal documents such as deﬁnitions of borders’, and also mention
the acquisition of territory and people, property rights and ownership transfer
(including land sale) after the king’s conquest, questions of retaliation, and legality.
The ‘alliance’ and ‘treaties’ with those communities conquered were concluded for-
mally with a set phrase that reiterated the claim to power by reference to Saba’s
main god.84
3.2.2. The Indian Ocean connection: Trade and rule in East Africa
In recent years the (international and transnational) history of the Indian Ocean
rim has received considerable attention by researchers around the world.85
Concentrating on the East African coast, it will sufﬁce here to point to the connec-
tions (in the ﬁrst millennium) between Africans and traders from Southern Arabia
and India as another arena of African international legal histories, in particular as
it concerns foreign rule and the exercise of ‘sovereignty’ over distant territories.
According to the Graeco-Egyptian Periplus Maris Erythraei, a travelogue for
merchants written in the ﬁrst century AD, the ‘country’ south of the Red Sea,
the coastal region in present-day Somalia, was ‘not subject to a King, but each mar-
ket-town is ruled by its separate chief’. This must, however, not mean that the East
African region is of no interest to those interested in ‘international legal histories’.
The authorities of the coastal territories summarily called ‘Azania’ in the Periplus,
located south of the Somali coast, were described in more detail:
82 I. Gerlach (ed.), South Arabia and its Neighbours. Phenomena of Intercultural Contacts (14. Rencontres Sabéennes)
(2015).
83 N. Nebes, Der Tatenbericht des Yiṯ aʿʾmarWatar bin Yakrubmalik aus Ṣ irwa¯ḥ (Jemen). Zur Geschichte Südarabiens
im frühen 1. Jahrtausend vor Christus. Mit einem archäologischen Beitrag von Iris Gerlach und Mike Schnelle (2016)
(Epigraphische Forschungen auf der Arabischen Halbinsel, Bd. 7), 72.
84 N. Nebes, Könige der Weihrauchstraße. Zur Geschichte Südarabiens und Äthiopiens im frühen 1. Jahrtausend
vor Christus (2014), 31, 38–43 (43 on the ‘Bundesschließungsformel’); N. Nebes, ‘Epigraphic South Arabian
inscriptions in Arabia’, (2007) 3 Encyclopaedia Aethiopica, at 153 f.; see H. Parzinger, ‘Vor und
Frühgeschichte’, in H.J. Gehrke (ed.), Die Welt vor 600. Frühe Zivilisationen (2017), 41, at 182.
85 G. Campbel (ed.), Early Exchange between Africa and the Wider Indian Ocean World (2016); H. Dalton, J. Salo,
P. Niemelä and S. Örmä, ‘Frederick II of Hohenstaufen’s Australasian Cockatoo. Symbol of Detente between
East and West and Evidence of the Ayyubids’ Global Reach’, (2018) 35 Parergon 35.
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Along this coast [near the market-town Rhapta, in the vicinity of the islands Zanzibar
and Maﬁa] live men of piratical habits : : : under separate chiefs for each place. The
Mapharitic chief governs it under some ancient right that subjects it to the sovereignty
of the state that is become ﬁrst in Arabia. And the people of Muza now hold it under
his authority, and send thither many large ships, using Arab captains and agents,
who are familiar with the natives and intermarry with them : : : 86
This hint at foreign rule along the East African coast is most relevant, as it points
to the Red Sea port townMuza in the Ma’aﬁr region, Yemen. The Yemeni rulers are
said to have not only controlled the East African trade (e.g., in ivory) with the
Mediterraneanworld, but possessed ‘sovereignty’ over this far-ﬂung place two thou-
sand kilometers south of Yemen.87 However, it is hitherto unknown what exactly is
meant by the term translated into English as ‘sovereignty’; it is unknown, for exam-
ple, whether it entailed rights to tax and obligations to defend the territory.
3.2.3. Ethiopia – an African sovereign state ‘to be admitted to the Family of Nations’ 88
In the writings of Charles Henry Alexandrowicz about Africa, the history of Ethiopia
plays, considering the index-entries ofThe European-AfricanConfrontation, a prominent
role.89 The ‘encouraging’ story of the only African state to withstand the onslaughts
of colonialism is indeed a fascinating one.90
The contacts between Ethiopian and European rulers reach back at least to the
European Middle Ages. The Vatican, Portugal, and Russia count among the states
having the oldest ties with this African state.91 There is indeed no dearth in (legal)
sources about international relations between European and Ethiopian govern-
ments, which were hampered by distance rather than lacking interest. Still, in
the late nineteenth century, Europeans and Americans were hesitant to recognize
Ethiopia as a sovereign member of the ‘family of nations’, to use a contemporary
expression.92 During a period when Africans were generally relegated by
European politicians and academics to the place of ‘the uncivilized’, Ethiopian rul-
ers, despite their Christian faith, found it challenging for their country to be given a
place among the tables of the ‘civilized’ states. Still, in 1884, Ethiopia’s Emperor
Menelik II signed a treaty with the British over their respective spheres of inﬂuence.
In 1889, a similar treaty was concluded with the Italians.93 Considering these
86 L. Casson, The Periplus Maris Erythraei (Greek-English) (1989), 61 f. (cpt. 14; 16).
87 T. Power, The Red Sea from Byzantium to the Caliphate. AD 500–1000 (2012); R.L. Pouwels, ‘Eastern Africa and
the Indian Ocean to 1800. Reviewing Relations in Historical Perspective’, (2002) 35 International Journal of
AfricanHistorical Studies 385; R.Mauny, ‘Le périple de lamer Érythrée et le problème du commerce romain en
Afrique au sud du Limes’, (1968) 38 Journal de la Société des Africanistes 19.
88 C.H. Alexandrowicz, ‘The Partition of Africa by Treaty (1974)’, in D. Armitage and J. Pitts (eds.), C. H.
Alexandrowicz, The Law of Nations in Global History (2017), 230, at 231.
89 Alexandrowicz, supra note 10, at 174. The index of the collected works of C.H. Alexandrowicz gives a similar
impression. See D. Armitage and J. Pitts (eds.),C. H. Alexandrowicz, The Law of Nations in Global History (2017),
424.
90 S. Rubenson, ‘Some Aspects of the Survival of Ethiopian Independence in the Period of the Scramble for
Africa’, (1961) 1 University College Review 8; S. Rubenson, ‘The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichale
Treaty’, (1964) 2 Journal of African History 243; H. Erlich, Ethiopia and the challenge of independence (1968).
91 L. Prijac (ed.), Foreign relations with Ethiopia. Human and diplomatic history (2015).
92 L. Oppenheim, International Law (1905), 108.
93 H. Elliesie, ‘Treaties and Multilateral Conventions’, (2014) 5 Encyclopaedia Aethiopica 537; H. Erlich, Ethiopia
and the challenge of independence (1968); H. Erlich, Ethiopia and Eritrea during the scramble for Africa. A political
biography of Ras Alula 1875-1897 (1982).
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processes of an Ethiopian–European rapprochement andMenelik’s own expansionist
agenda, historians speak of ‘Ethiopia’s success : : : to have actively participated as
the only African state in the partitioning of the continent’.94 In 1891, Menelik
boldly announced to the European rulers: ‘I have no intention at all to remain
an indifferent spectator while distant powers take it upon themselves to divide
Africa.’95 He saw himself as a monarch of equal standing with his European broth-
ers. In this spirit he immediately acceded to the Act of Brussels (1890) in the year of
its enactment. The Act was ‘entirely concernedwith African problems’ and Ethiopia
(and two years later also Liberia) ‘appear[s] here as contracting parties and active
participants in the development and application of the Ofﬁcial Guardianship prin-
ciple as proclaimed by the Berlin Conference [in 1885]’.96 Yet, Ethiopia’s ultimate
success is explained by Menelik’s military victory against the Italians in 1896.
Following this victory and a treaty with Italy recognizing Ethiopia’s sovereignty,
Menelik followed a ‘carefully constructed, non-committal foreign policy’. His goal
was to strengthen his hard-won sovereignty and to use to Ethiopia’s advantage the
competition of his three European neighbours.97 Given that Ethiopia bordered six
different colonial territories of three European powers, around 1900 the inter-
national agreements about the exact course of the borders was a main task of the
Ethiopian ofﬁcials dealing with foreign policy.98
Several European states and the United States now began to consider Ethiopia as
a potential ally. ‘Ethiopia stipulated diplomatic exchanges in treaties’.99 Britain,
France, Italy, Belgium, Russia, the United States, Germany, and later Turkey set
up Legations in the new capital Addis Ababa and extended their consular
jurisdiction over Ethiopia. From now on, Ethiopia was indisputably on the map
of international politics. The victory over the Italians was its billet d‘ entrée into
the family of ‘civilized nations’ – where the ‘chief standard of civilization was, of
course, power’. Or, as an often-quoted Japanese diplomat put it cynically after
his country’s victory over Russia in 1905: ‘We show ourself at least your equal
in scientiﬁc butchery, and at oncewe are admitted to your council tables as civilized
men.’100 Alexandrowicz depicted this absurdity in similar terms in his legal study,
94 C. Marx, Geschichte Afrikas. Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart (2004), 69.
95 Menelik to French President Carnot, 21 April 1891, as quoted in R. Caulk, ‘Between the Jaws of Hyenas’.
A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia (1876–1896) (2002), 269.
96 Alexandrowicz, supra note 10, at 116.
97 H.G. Marcus, ‘The Foreign Policy of the EmperorMenilek 1896–1898. A Rejoinder’, (1966) 7 Journal of African
History 117, at 122.
98 B. Taﬂa, Ethiopia and Germany: Cultural, Political, and Economic Relations, 1871–1936 (1981), 128 f.; see Franco-
Ethiopian agreement of 29 and 30 January 1897, DDF XIII: 147; [British] Treaties with Ethiopia, and with
Ethiopia and Italy respecting Frontiers between the Soudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, 15 May 1902. P. P. Cd.
1370. Treaty Series, No. 16. (1902); [British] Agreement with Ethiopia respecting Frontiers of British East
Africa, Uganda, and Ethiopia, 6 December, 1907. P. P. Cd. 4318. Treaty Series, No. 27 (1908); see the map
of 1908 detailing the boundaries of Ethiopia according to the relevant treaties reprinted in B. Zewede,
‘Boundaries with the Sudan’, (2003) 5 Encyclopaedia Aethiopica, 613; H. Marcus, The Life and Times of
Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913 (1995), 179–90.
99 Alexandrowicz, supra note 10, at 109; On 16 November 1909 President Fallières promulgated a law extend-
ing consular jurisdiction to French citizens and protégés in Ethiopia, see (1910) 16 Revue Générale de Droit
International Public 680.
100 Quoted by R.P. Anand, ‘Inﬂuence of History on the Literature of International Law’, in R.P. Anand,
International Law and the Developing Countries. Confrontation or Cooperation? (1987), 1, at 29.
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stating that ‘when Ethiopia defeated the [Italians in 1896], she became at once a
civilised country’.101
4. CONCLUSION
‘In most academic literature’, writes Gbenga Oduntan, ‘it would seem as if inter-
national laws have never had roots in Africa.’102 This may explain why writing
about the ‘periphery’ or ‘semi-periphery’ of international law seems to be, consid-
ering a number of recent contributions, still in urgent need of justiﬁcation. Some
authors employ an almost apologetic tone towards their readers, to whom they
apparently feel obliged to explain why they should continue reading about the
‘periphery’. Arnulf Becker Lorca, for example, cautions: ‘One may think about
the history of international law in Africa, Asia, Latin America or Russia as minor
or local histories.’ He continues to show that these histories are more than ‘non-
Western cultural heirloom’, but ‘local stories [that] are part of a common history
of international law’.103 With regard to ‘Africa’, others go so far as to characterize
the mere writing about ‘Africa’s contribution to the history of international law’ as
‘an empowering act’.104 It seems, therefore, necessary to ask whether the Hegelian
narrative on Africa and its alleged ‘irrelevance’ for global history and philosophy105
is still looming large in Western minds, and thus the mere fact of mentioning
‘Africa’s contribution’ can be stylized as ‘an empowering act’.
However, more important than such political epithets, a thorough, source-based
analysis of the past that goes beyond the somewhat parochial paradigm of
‘Africa’s contribution to the history of international law’ is needed. This includes
due consideration of the methodological traps and risks of projecting European
international law categories onto Africa’s past. And still, when asked ‘why does
th[is] history matter?’106, the answer given by Martti Koskenniemi when consider-
ing how to deal with Eurocentrism holds true for this research subject too:
Histories of non-European worlds are needed to illuminate the diversity of human
experience and to create critical distance towards the intuitive naturalness of stories
we have learned. So far, the attention of postcolonial critics has been perhaps more on
the critique of European practices than on examining alternative institutions and
vocabularies.107
Laying bare these institutions and vocabularies is then another stepping stone in
the monumental task awaiting the social sciences to ‘provincialize Europe’.108
The previous section on the three African ‘arenas’ takes up the challenge posed
by Elias and others following him in the attempt ‘to break new ground by bringing
to light aspects of inter-state law which has existed in Africa prior to the [European]
101 Alexandrowicz, supra note 10, at 22.
102 Oduntan, supra note 8, at 6.
103 Becker Lorca, supra note 19, at 13.
104 Martineau, supra note 12, at 335.
105 Dübgen and Skupien, supra note 4, at 9.
106 Martinez, supra note 25, at 236.
107 Koskenniemi, supra note 40, at 171.
108 D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial thought and historical difference (2000).
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scramble for colonial territories’.109 Evidently, these histories are barely part of
the development of the jus gentium europaeum, and thus historians of international
law hitherto wrote the histories they wrote without due consideration to the
developments in Africa that did not involve or affect the jus gentium europaeum.
By describing ‘the East African littoral’ as an ancient arena of ‘inter-state law which
has existed in Africa prior to the [European] scramble for colonial territories’,
historians shed light on the possibilities and perspectives of African ‘internation-
ality’. By doing so they can write international legal histories beyond the narrative
frame set by European colonialism and its involvement with international law.
Many other arenas of ‘internationality’ in Africa await further research.
109 A.K. Mensah-Brown (ed.), African international legal history (United Nations Institute for Training and Research)
(1975), 1, quoted in Gathii, supra note 11, at 417.
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